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ABSTPACI'
Thiscontinent compares two alternative systems of
private antitrust enforcement. In one (referred to as
the "damage multiplier approach"), the plaintiff
receives what the defendant pays; in the other (the
"decoupling approach"), this constraint is not imposed.
Reducing treble damages to single damages
("detrebling") would be an example of the first
approach. Making the defendant pay treble damages
while only giving the plaintiff single damages would be
an example of the second approach. It is shown, using
the principles of the the economic theory of
enforcement, that the decoupling approach is preferable
to the damage multiplier approach, and that the optimal
system of decoupling could award the plaintiff more or
less than what the defendant pays. Several additional
issues are raised that need to be considered before




Stanford,CA 94305One of the most talked about ideas in antitrust policy
during the past several years is the notion of "detrebling"
private antitrust damages. [1] This concept has several
variations. Sometimes it refers to a mandatory reduction of
treble damages to single damages for certain types of private
antitrust actions (e.g., suits against joint research ventures),
and other times it refers to a discretionary reduction of the
damage multiplier on a case by case basis. For purposes of this
comment, the critical feature of all of the detrebling proposals
is that the plaintiff receives what the defendant pays. C23
In sharp contrast to the attention given to detrebling is
the almost complete absence of consideration given to the concept
of "decoupling" antitrust damages. Decoupling refers to a system
of liability in which the plaintiff receives something different
than what the defendant pays. For example, the defendant might
pay treble damages, with the plaintiff only receiving single
damages (the difference being collected by the government). To
my knowledge, the concept of decoupling antitrust damages was
first proposed by Warren Schwartz in an article in the Georgetown
Law Journal in 1980, and then was completely ignored until it
received brief mention in the paper by Steven Salop and Lawrence
White prepared for this conference. [3]
The principal message of this comment is that the emphasis
in antitrust policy discussions on detrebling--to the virtual
exclusion of decoupling--is misplaced. I will argue, using the
principles of the economic theory of enforcement, that there is a
stronger case in favor of decoupling. I will also show, contrary
2to the presumption of Schwartz and of Salop and White, that the
optimal system of decoupling may require that the plaintiff
receive more, rather than less, than what the defendant pays.
In the first part of the comment, the economic theory of
enforcement is briefly reviewed. Then, in the second part, the
lessons of the theory for the choice between detrebling and
decoupling, and for the optimal design of a decoupling system,
are discussed. In the final part of the comment, some remaining
questions that need to be addressed before decoupling can be
recommended in practice are mentioned.
The Economic Theory of Enforcement
The modern economic theory of enforcement began with a
seminal paper by Gary Becker on crime and punishment. [4J
Becker's theory, which assumes that the government does the
enforcing, is easily explained. (In summarizing Becker's
reasoning, I will refer to firms, although the same logic can be
applied to individuals.) Suppose firms obtain some gain from
engaging in an activity that imposes costs on others. Examples
of such activities include polluting the air, evadingtaxes, and
attempting to monopolize an industry. If it were costless for
the public enforcement authority to catch or observe firms when
they engage in a harm-creating activity, presumably every firm
would be caught and fined an amount equal to the external cost of
the activity. Firms would then engage in the activityonly if
their private benefits exceed the external cost. And, from
society's perspective, such behavior would be efficient.
3However, in most situations it is difficult or costly for
the enforcement authority to catch firms that impose external
costs. If, as a result, firms are not caught with certainty,
they would engage in the harm—creating activity too often unless
they are made to pay more than the harm caused when they are
caught. Becker observed that the fine could be raised to a level
such that, as before, firms would engage in the activity only if
their private gains exceed the external cost. Since this outcome
can be achieved for any given probability of catching firms and
since it is costlier to catch a larger fraction of those engaging
in the activity, Becker argued that the enforcement authority
should set the probability very low and the fine correspondingly
high.[5] This low probability/high fine combination
characterizes the optimal system of public enforcement.
In a subsequent paper, Becker and George Stigler suggested
that a system of competitive private enforcement-—in which the
first individual or firm to discover and report the violation
would receive the fine--could duplicate the outcome under optimal
public enforcement.[6J This suggestion was quickly challenged by
William Landes and Richard Posner. [7J Landes and Posner claimed
that private enforcement would lead to too much enforcement
relative to optimal public enforcement. Their intuitive
explanation was based on the following observations. Under
public enforcement, if detection were certain, the fine should be
set equal to the external damage caused by the activity. By
raising the fine and lowering the probability of detection, the
same level of deterrence can be achieved at less cost. Under
4private enforcement, however, they pointed out that raising the
fine would lead to a higher probability of detection since self-
interested private enforcers would be induced to invest more in
enforcement. From this observation they concluded that a private
system of enforcement would lead to "overenforcement."
In a paper following this exchange, I showed that Becker and
Stigler's hypothesis (that private enforcement could duplicate
the public enforcement outcome) might be wrong for a different
reason than that identified by Landes and Posner.[8j The main
point of my paper was that private enforcement would lead in a
wide range of circumstances to too little enforcement relative to
optimal public enforcement. This result, which tends to occur
when the external damage from the violation is large, can be
explained as follows.
Under private enforcement, individuals or firms are willing
to invest in enforcement only if they at least break even-—that
is, only if their fine revenue is at least as great as their
enforcement costs. Under public enforcement, however, the
optimal probability/fine combination may result in fine revenue
which is less than enforcement costs. This is particularly
likely to occur when the damage from the violation is large since
it is then optimal to deter most, if not all, potential
violators. Because the fine that can be imposed is limited(by
the net worth of the potential violators), optimal public
enforcement may require a high probability of detection and
correspondingly large enforcement costs. But if most potential
violators are deterred and the fine that can be obtained from
5those who are riot is limited, the fine revenue collected by the
public enforcement authority may well be less than the cost of
enforcement. If so, private enforcers would not be willing to
invest enough in enforcement to achieve the same level of
deterrence as under public enforcement since they would not be
able to break even. In other words, a private system of
enforcement could lead to "underenforcement."
This summarizes the principal results in the economictheory
of enforcement that are relevant to the present discussion.
Lessons from the Theory
There are two lessons that I wish to draw from the theory of
enforcement, one concerning the choice between detrebling and
decoupling, and the other relating to the optimal design of a
decoupling system.
Detrebling versus Decoupling
One of the principal conclusions of the theory was that if
private enforcers receive the fine paid by the injurer, it is
generally impossible to achieve the optimal combination of the
probability of detection and the fine. If the same fine is used
as under optimal public enforcement, the resulting probability of
detection (generated by the self-interested choices of private
enforcers) may be too high or too low. In other words, if the
enforcing is done privately, there may be too much enforcement or
too little enforcement. The same conclusion applies to private
damage actions in antitrust law since, under the current system,
6the plaintiff generally receives what the defendant pays. [9]
Advocates of detrebling presumably believe that awarding
successful plaintiffs three times their damages induces them and
their lawyers to invest too much in the detection and prosecution
of antitrust violations. The only way to reduce enforcement
under the present system is to reduce the damage multiplier. [10]
However, as the discussion of the theory of enforcement makes
clear, this response may not be the cheapest way to attain the
desired level of deterrence. It may be socially preferable to
raise, not lower, the amount paid by the defendant, while at the
same time reducing the incentives for plaintiffs and their
lawyers to invest in enforcement. If antitrust damages are
decoupled, the lower level of deterrence that is desired can be
achieved more cheaply by awarding the plaintiff less than what
the defendant pays.
It should be stressed, however, that the advantage of
decoupling over detrebling does not depend on whether it is
desirable to reduce the level of deterrence from that currently
generated by treble damages. The reasoning behind this
conclusion is essentially the same as that used in the previous
paragraph--specifically, that the decoupling approach can attain
the same level of deterrence as any damage multiplier, but with a
lower probability of detection, and therefore with lower
enforcement costs. The details of the argument follow.
First select the best possible damage multiplier in a system
in which the plaintiff receives what the defendant pays. This
multiplier could be less than or greater than three. Whatever
7the multiplier is, it will generate some probability of detection
as a result of the investment incentives of private enforcers.
Now consider a system of decoupled damages. Under this
system, raise the amount paid by the defendant from the level
determined by the best damage multiplier.ll If the plaintiff
still were to receive the same amount as under the damage
multiplier approach, the level of deterrence would be higher in
the decoupled system because the probability of detection would
be the same but the defendant would be paying more. Therefore,
without changing what the defendant pays (from the now higher
level), reduce the amount awarded to the plaintiff until the
resulting probability of detection falls to a level such that the
defendant is deterred to the same degree under both systems.
It is now easy to see why the decoupling approach is
superior to the damage multiplier approach. Each approach can
achieve the desired level of deterrence of antitrust violations.
But the decoupling approach can attain this level of deterrence
with a lower probability of detection, and therefore with lower
enforcement costs. Thus, regardless of whether it is desirable
to lower, raise, leave unchanged the present damage multiplier
of three, the decoupling approach is preferable g the damage
multiplier approach.
Optimal Decoupling
Because of the focus on reducing private antitrust
enforcement by detrebling antitrust damages, it is not surprising
that the few individuals who have considered decoupling have
8taken for granted that the optimal system of decoupling would
award the plaintiff less than what the defendant pays. This
presumption would be correct if private enforcement is excessive
under the damage multiplier approach, since it would then be
desirable to discourage plaintiffs and their lawyers from
investing too much in detection and prosecution. [12]
However, as noted earlier, private enforcement may lead to
underenforcement rather than overenforcement. If private
enforcement is inadequate, then the optimal system of decoupling
would require that the plaintiff receive more than what the
defendant pays (with the subsidy presumably coming from the
government). For reasons explained earlier, this outcome is most
likely to occur when the damage from the violation is large.
Thus, the optimal system of decoupling could award the plaintiff
more or less than what the defendant pays.
The implications of this conclusion for antitrust policy are
straightforward. In those areas of antitrust law in which it is
thought that overenforceinent currently is a problem——for example,
with respect to joint research ventures--the plaintiff could be
given less than what the defendant pays. While in areas in which
underenforcement might otherwise occur——for example, with respect
to horizontal price fixing--the plaintiff could be awarded more
than what the defendant pays.
It should be pointed out, in passing, that the conclusion
that the optimal system of decoupling could award the plaintiff
more than what the defendant pays is not inconsistent with the
argument used to show that decoupling is superior to detrebling.
9The earlier argument demonstrated that there always exists some
system of decoupling (one in which the plaintiff receives less
than what the defendant pays) that is preferable to the best
damage multiplier. It did not purport to derive the best system
of decoupling, as is done here.
Concludinc Remarks
The concept of decoupling is not an abstract curiosity
derived from the economic theory of enforcement. There are
several instances in which damages are already decoupled,
although not always for the reasons suggested in this comment.
For example, given current tax laws, antitrust damages are in
effect decoupled in all private antitrust actions that follow
successful criminal prosecutions by the government. In these
cases, all of the plaintiff's award is treated as taxable income,
while only one—third of the defendant's payment can be deducted.
Thus, with the tax consequences taken into account, the plaintiff
receives less than what the defendant pays (and the difference
goes to the government). Although the tax treatment of antitrust
damages is not designed to promote optimal deterrence, this
example shows that an explicit policy of decoupling antitrust
damages would not be as radical a departure from current practice
as might be thought.
Before decoupling can be recommended to policy makers, there
are several additional issues that need to be considered. Since
these issues have not yet been analyzed in a systematic way, I
will only list some of the questions that remain to be
10answered: [13]
--How should a system of decoupling deal with out-
of—court settlements? For example, if at trial the
plaintiff would receive less than what the defendant
pays, should the settlement be "taxed" by the same
amount? By the same percentage? What if the court is
unable to monitor the settlement? Will out-of-court
settlements tend to subvert or enhance the desirable
effects on deterrence of the decoupling approach?
--If at trial the plaintiff would receive more
than what the defendant pays, why won't the parties
"fabricate" an offense in order to obtain the implicit
governmental subsidy? How should a system of
decoupling respond to this possibility? Can fabricated
offenses be adequately deterred simply by the threat of
penalties for such behavior?
--What will be the impact of a system of
decoupling on the price of the product sold by the
defendant? For example, if the plaintiffs are
purchasers of the defendant's product and if they would
receive less at trial than what the defendant pays,
won't their demand for the product--and consequently
the price--be lower than what it would be if they were
to receive exactly what the defendant pays? How will
the price be affected if the plaintiffs are competitors
of the defendant? Suppliers to the defendant? Dealers
of the defendant? Are the price changes induced by a
11system of decoupling desirable?
If a system of decoupling can deal satisfactorily with the issues
raised by these questions, then decoupling may be superior to
detrebling not only in theory, but also in practice.
12Notes
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[1] See, for example, Garvey (1984) and Easterbrook (1985).
[2] Of course, this is also a feature of the present system
of treble damages, as well as of proposals to increase the damage
multiplier. As will be seen, the principal points of this
comment apply regardless of the level of the damage multiplier.
My focus is on detrebling because most recent proposals have been
to reduce the multiplier.
[3] See Schwartz (1980, pp. 1092-96) and Salop and White
(1985, Pp. 52 & 70) .Seealso Schwartz (1981, Pp. 10—15)
Warren Schwartz based his recommendation for decoupling antitrust
damages on arguments developed by William Landes and Richard
Posner in a paper on the private enforcement of law. See Landes
and Posner (1975). See also note 6 below.
[4] See Becker (1968).
[5] The logical implication of this argument is that the
fine should equal a firm's net worth. This extreme implication
of Beckers theory is not essential to my analysis of detrebling
and decoupling.
[6] See Becker and Stigler (1974, pp. 13-16). They did,
however, raise the possibility at the end of their discussion
that private enforcement might not be optimal and that a tax on
13private enforcers might be desirable.
[7] See Landes and Posner (1975).
[8] See Polinsky (1980)
[9] The analogy between competitive private enforcement and
private damage actions in antitrust law is not perfect. In the
former context, anyone can become an enforcer, whereas in the
latter context, only the antitrust victim can, at least
nominally, do the enforcing. Moreover, in the antitrust context,
the victim must share the award with his lawyer. However, these
differences do not seem essential, especially when one considers
the entrepreneurial role played by plaintiff antitrust lawyers.
[10] I am, of course, ignoring other means by which
enforcement could be reduced, such as changing the allocation of
legal costs or changing other procedural or substantive rules.
These considerations are beyond the scope of this comment.
[11] If the damage multiplier is so high that it is not
possible to raise the amount paid by the defendant, then a
slightly different argument would have to be used. However, the
conclusion would be the same.
[12] A more precise version of this point is as follows.
If, under the damage multiplier approach, private enforcers would
overenforce when the damage multiplier is such that the defendant
is paying as much as possible, then it is desirable under the
decoupling approach for the plaintiff to receive less than what
the defendant pays.(An analogous statement could be made in the
next paragraph.)
[13] Many of the questions listed below have been answered
14either in the context of general discussions of private versus
public enforcement or in the context of specific discussions of
private antitrust enforcement (in which the plaintiff receives
what the defendant pays). Whether, or to what extent, the
answers apply to a system of decoupling is currently unclear.
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